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G L O B A L I S A T I O N ,  ( D E ) C I V I L I S A T I O N  A N D  M O R A L I T Y
H e i k o  S c h r a d e r
0 .  In t roduc t ion 1
This paper is concerned with the question what happens to morality/ethics in the course
of globalisation. A background theory that I apply is Norbert Elias'ss civilisation theory.
In the civilisation process, argues Elias, a number of parallel processes occurred. The
shift from pre-modern to modern society was characterised among other things as a shift
in internally pacified institutions, laws, constraints and morality/ethic. The nation-state
was in Elias's analysis the largest such unit which held the monopoly of force and marked
an important boundary between an inner and outer morality.
Sociologists, however, have identified a further transgression from modern to post-
modern society, some of them having the vision of ‘world society’. The questions to me
are obvious: What happens to the nation-state in the course of globalisation, to its
monopoly of force and to the suppression of at least internal violence? To put it in
coloquial language: How far is morality affected by globalisation?
The first part of this paper discusses the bundle of globalisation processes. I will argue
that globalisation challenges the nation-state. On the one hand, supra-national economic
and political units emerge. On the other hand, globalisation is more than homogenisation.
It is simultaneously localisation and fragmentation.
The second part considers the importance of morality at the nation-state level in a kind
of equilibrium analysis. The important issue for philosophers, social scientists and
economists has always been what constitutes the glue of society (or - to use John Elster's
[1989] metaphor: its 'cement'). I argue that a stable market society requires the composite
of the three control principles: market, state and morality. What, however, happens when
the importance of the state as a counter-control principle to the market decreases in the
course of globalisation?
                                               
1 An earlier version of this paper was submitted to the Eidos-Conference ‘Globalisation
and Decivilisation’ at University of Wageningen in Dec. 1995.
2The third part of my paper takes up this question from two sides. One side is a
pessimistic scenario: The monopoly of force that was held by the nation-state cannot be
shifted to supra-national organisations for a number of reasons. This results in an
increased potential of infra- and supra-national violence. A more optimistic view is that
morality gets increasingly important in the course of globalisation. I do not believe in a
newly emerging global morality. However, in a globalised world individual and
collective actors aim at reducing the risen complexity of life, the risk and uncertainty
involved. I argue that even at the highest transnational level personalised networks
structure the social and economic fabric and these are characterised by a high degree of
morality. The seeming paradox occurs that globalisation and personalisation are closely
related to each other.
1 .  Globa l i sa t ion  Processes
Globalisation is a bundle of parallel processes. According to Archer (1991: 133) they
engender a ‘growing world-wide interconnectedness of structure, culture and agency’.
For Margaret Archer globalisation means that societies are no longer the prime units of
analysis of sociology. Albrow (1990: 9, 11) argues that societies can no longer be
considered as a system in an environment of other systems but also as subsystems of the
larger inclusive world society.
On the level of political economy globalisation is closely linked with the weakening of
the nation-state as the prime decision maker and identity marker. Neoliberal economists
argue that growing competition in the Third World requires to reconstruct the economy
as a more efficient regionalised, supra-national space in the West with an internal free
flow of means of production and commodities. They simply transnationalise the
neoclassical market model. From the point of view of national politics this implies to
dissolve trade impediments at the national boundaries (e.g. national customs policies,
currencies, labour laws, settlement regulations, environment laws, etc.), and shift certain
seignieurial rights from the nation-state to supra-national institutions and organisations.
These aim at homogenising national laws, rights and obligations. A final aim of these
attempts is the emergence of certain supra-national spaces with a common policy in
economic and non-economic spheres.
The idea of such supra-national spaces is not new, and there were a number of trade
associations in the post-war era such as EEC, EFTA, ASEAN or COMECON. Some of
3them have survived, some of them disappeared with the collapse of the command
economies, and some of them have been absorbed by further advanced associations. The
vision of the EC is the creation of an economic and political 'supermarket'. The recent
APEC meeting in Jakarta pronounced to develop a similar market in the Asian-Pacific
region.2 A major difficulty to set up, maintain and even further advance such economic
and political spaces is that it requires the nation-states involved to drop certain autonomy
and shift control from the nation-state to the supra-national level.
Ethnic identities may fall along nation-state boundaries like in the old world,
particularly in countries with a long tradition of civil society such as France or the UK.
As a matter of fact citizens and politicians of former empires with strong national
identities are not as easy to drop their autonomy and certain identity markers such as
country-specific weights and measures, currencies, etc. as countries with a more critical
look at their imperialist histories. Furthermore, in political and economic crises the
national identity is a useful tool to draw upon and conceal certain internal constraints.
However, globalisation does not necessarily imply that we all live in the same social
world. Local priorities and interests still constitute our social worlds. This means first of
all that heterogenisation and homogenisation are both consequences of globalisation
(Smart 1994: 153).
The process of globalisation requires an opening of the boundaries and increasingly
questions the unit ‘nation-state’. A commonly held view is that globalisation produces
uniformity and standardisation through technological, commercial and cultural
synchronisation. However, the other side of the coin of globalisation is a hybridisation of
cultures that gives rise to a global mélange (Nederveen-Pieterse 1994, see also
Featherstone 1990). The weakening of national identities in the course of globalisation
may cause a decline of patriotism. The other way around, however, migration movements
within the process of globalisation, may strengthen patriotism and long-distance
nationalism.3
However, more common is that national and ethnic identities fall asunder. State
boundaries are political and not ethnic boundaries, and national identities are constructs.
                                               
2 The Southeast Asian attitude towards Westernisation (represented by the United
states) decisively hampers this project.
3 Recent statements of American rightist Jews to the murder of Rabin provide an
example of this.
4According to Bamyeh (1993: 2ff.) the strength of the nation-state is based on a superior
organisation capacity, in which everything is identified with the nation.4 Anderson (1988)
even speaks of the nation-state as an ‘imagined community’ (see also Cassirer 1979).
This is particularly visible in weak nation-states (I define weak states in the Weberian
sense of having no monopoly of force).5 In a number of Third World states and former
socialist countries in Eastern Europe a national identity is very weak and vulnerable and
nationalist symbolism cannot overcome this weakness. Ethnic processes can lead to the
break-up of a nation-state into smaller, ethnically marked units. This is what happened in
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. To put it another way, globalisation may
produce both unification and fragmentation, common identity and awareness of political
difference, both supra-national and sub-national regionalism.
From world-system perspective regionalised, transnational politico-economic spaces
cut across the emergence of a world-society and instead lead to particularisms. From the
point of view of political economy they may engender
(i) competition between supra-national blocks that lead to the emergence of new
boundaries (e.g. US-EC customs duties, quotas for Japanese imports into the EC etc.). At
the moment we can observe a growing mercantilism on this transnational level. Trade
statistics already demonstrate that the bulk of trade takes place within such boundaries
and not across them (such as the US economy or the EU).6
(ii) An uneven distribution of wealth and economic power within these supra-national
spaces provides a development slope (such as between Germany and Portugal) that may
raise tensions between the nation-states and citizens involved. The ongoing discussion in
                                               
4 "The lesson of Europe, which the rest of the world began to digest fully with the
colonial period, was that one of the essential prerequisites for prevailing over the other
was neither richness nor formal governance by themselves, but superior cultural
organisation capacity, whereby everything within the domain of 'country' is made
serviceable to the designs of the state through its appropriation of 'national' endowment"
(Bamyeh 1993: 14, quoted by Korff 1995: 6).
5 With regard to weak states the often seeming paradox occurs that they have strong
state apparatuses and suppression mechanisms. A characteristic of weak states is,
furthermore, an economic protectionism.
6 The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989
from 51 to 59 percent in Europe, 33 to 37 percent in East Asiam and 32 to 36 percent in
North America (Huntington 1993: 27).
5the EU on the introduction of the currency union for hard-currency countries only
provides such an example. Furthermore, citizens of the richer countries are afraid that a
transfer of wealth occurs from their home region to the less developed countries within
the union, while the other way around these expect such a transfer.
(iii) Finally, the emergence of regionalised supra-national economic and political spaces
may engender changes in centre-periphery constellations within the world economy.
Some scholars dared the prognosis of a fall of the old centre into the periphery and the
rise of a new centre in the Asian-Pacific region. Frank and Gills (1993) argue that within
history a number of hegemonial shifts occurred, so that another shift is at least possible, if
not probable. Neoliberal economists add some fuel to the fire by arguing that the old
industrial countries had the high cost of invention, whereas in the course of globalisation
technological transfers have made the NICs link up with the West and even overtake it
due to lower cost of production and only small costs of invention.
From the sociologist’s point of view the policy of new transnational spaces aims at
creating new transnational identities with homogenised rights and liabilities within the
boundaries, joint ID-cards, currencies, flags, hymns, etc. At the same time, however, this
policy excludes all those who are outsiders to these spaces. Two-class identities emerge:
the ‘neighbour’ and the ‘stranger’. Neighbours obtain privileged conditions in a number
of economic and political matters, while strangers are kept outside by introducing new
settlement and visa regulations, asylum laws, etc. Simultaneously the emphasis of the
media is put to the inner space, and the outer space is increasingly loosing ground in the
consciousness of the people. Development sociologists discuss the ‘End of the Third
World’ (Menzel 1992). This does not only address the loss of the meta-development
theories of the seventies but also an increasing exclusion of the Third World from
transfer payments, from entry to the West at the outer walls of these spaces, and from the
consciousness of the insiders. The ‘stranger’, however, has always been easily identified
with the potential enemy (see Simmel 1908).
Summarising this point: Contemporary sociology has extended beyond the forms of
social life which are found within the boundaries of the modern nation-state to consider
transnational and/or global forms. However, the term ‘global society’ implies that all
people are incorporated into a single, global world. I tried to show so far that this is only
one side of the coin which emphasises aspects of global technology, information society
or consumer culture. The other side of the coin is a heterogenisation and even
fragmentation in a number of fields as a consequence of globalisation. We are far from
6living all within the same social world. Local and regional priorities and interests still
continue to exist, providing a number of parallel social worlds that we inhabit.
Homogenisation and heterogenisation are both consequences of processes of
globalisation. To express this some scholars already suggested to replace the term
‘globalisation’ with ‘glocalisation’. On the one hand, the latter term signifies the diversity
of processes that simultaneously take place, on the other hand, it again neglects the newly
emerging boundaries on this meso-level: regionalised transnational spaces.
Having so far described globalisation processes I turn to another issue: market, state
and morality, the three control principles of society.
2 .  The  Cont ro l  P r inc ip les  o f  Soc ie ty
Elsewhere I addressed the relation of market, state and morality in social science and
economics (Schrader 1994a). The discussion was more or less confined to the closed
society or the nation-state. I analysed what happened to the three control principles in the
transformation (or civilisation) process from traditional (or pre-modern) to modern
society. For the sake of my arguments in this paper I would like to summarise some
important issues and concepts before turning to the question what happens to morality in
the second 'Great Transformation' (to paraphrase Polanyi) from modern to post-modern
or globalised society.
Theories of economics and social science approach the relation of the three control
principles of market, state and society in a kind of equilibrium analysis. Literature usually
applies the terms market and morality in a normative way. From the bourgeois
perspective the market is a synonym for rationalism, freedom and democracy, from the
romantic and Marxist point of view it is an expression of alienation, egotism and loss of
values. I provide three traditions differently interpreting the transformation process which
read as follows:
(1) According to economic liberalism the modernisation process has freed the individual
from communal constraints and morally legitimised traditional structures of domination
by the way of liberalising the means of production and by economic integration. Bringing
this interpretation to the point, during the process of socio-economic change morality was
increasingly substituted by the market. Development, however, went further from
industrial society or modernity to post-industrialism (Bell 1985) or post-modernity
7(Lyotard 1986). From such a perspective globalisation of the economy is the emergence
of a world-wide market that dissolves international impediments of the free flow of
production factors, goods and services. A by-product of this process is the
homogenisation of culture and consumer patterns.
(2) Another description of change was provided by Karl Polanyi (1978) and the
Substantivist School (Polanyi et al. 1957). They argued that until the emergence of the
self-regulating market the economic sphere was embedded in society. Only in the course
of the Great Transformation, the emergence of the self-regulating market as the control
principle of capitalism, the economy was disembedded from and even began to dominate
society and to re-structure it according to its requirements. However, so the argument, the
self-regulating market that operated on an international scale, provoked the introduction
of governmental and social mechanisms of protection against its destructive (and self-
destructive) consequences - measures that aimed at re-embedding the market. In
summary, the Great Transformation caused the following consequences: Morality, the
traditional control principle of society, was substituted by the market principle. However,
the state and a number of associations have taken certain functions of protection against
the disruptive forces of the market. A continuation of writing ‘The Great Transformation’
for post-modern society might suggest the necessity of even a stronger interference with
the free market by international control organisations and, as some neo-substantivists
suggest, a re-embedding of certain interactions into social structures (e.g. Hettne 1990;
Schrader 1995).
(3) A third perspective is Norbert Elias's (1981, 1988, 1993) description of the process of
civilisation. Civilisation, according to Elias, means the reduction of force, violence and
external control through the establishment of institutions and self-control. With the
integration of larger units, new institutions emerge. These strengthen internal pacification
which, in turn, enforces integration. While internally the use of violence is negatively
sanctioned, violence along the boundaries is allowed and quite often increases, partly due
to the power potential of larger units to apply violence, partly as a means to conceal
internal problems and strenghen cohesion. The control of force through institutions
allows and demands the transformation of previous ‘external constrains’ into ‘self-
constrains’. So far, the nation state is the largest such unit in which a monopoly of force
has been established. The application of Elias's view to my perspective suggests the
8following interpretation: Morality, market and state are interdependent. Their importance
as a control principle increases in the course of social differentiation.7
Elias's analysis stops at the nation-state level. However, as shown in the first part of this
paper, the globalisation process and political attempts to supra-national integration
challenge the pivotal position of the nation-state as the combination of a territorial,
political, social, economic and military unit. The deconstruction of the nation-state for the
sake of higher aggregates poses the question what happens to the monopoly of force and
morality. Are there any hints for the emergence of a new, global morality that prescribes
to be everyone’s brother or sister and dissolves conflicts associated with boundaries? Are
we so civilised (morally constrained) that we regret violence against ‘strangers’
(whatever marks their ‘otherness’) potential enemies? Or, are we so barbarian that the
newly emerging transnational boundaries mark the new boundary between inner and
outer morality, whereas inner morality can only be maintained by jointly attacking
outsiders?
Let us take a closer look at the term ‘morality’: I understand this term functionally as an
internalised control principle. It sets certain limits to selfish action for the sake of social
life that have been determined by society or ruling power. According to Rupert Lay
(1991: 27-9) moral action is bound to a weighting between the realisation of self-interest
and the avoidance of psychical conflicts (feeling guilt or shame, loss of self-esteem, etc.)
and social sanctions (loss of reputation or social security). Morality regulates interaction
by means of generally accepted and usually adhered standards such as norms, rules or
customs, attitudes, prejudices and orientations of value (Lay 1991: 91). Furthermore,
what is important here, morality may constitute an unquestioned guideline for collective
action. An example provides the attitude towards Jews throughout the European, and
particularly German, history. Important for this paper is that morality underlies social
change and certain real or imagined boundaries.8
                                               
7 Whereas Elias refers to shame that particularly has been questioned (Duerr 1988), I
believe that internalised self-control and its mechanisms can be circumscribed with
morality and ethic, respectively.
8 Max Weber distinguished inner and outer morality. Furthermore, according to
Durkheim there are a number of particular moralities in different social contexts (such as
family, job, neighbourhood, citizenship).
9With regard to the relation of the three control principles ‘market, state and morality’ I
argue that the normatively legitimised, free market game à la Hayek is an insufficient
control principle for the functioning of society. However, it is also short-sighted to call
for the state as a counter-balancing control principle: the state as an entrepreneur, where
the market becomes disequilibrated and where private provision of goods and services is
ineffective, or as the regulative institution in state capitalism to set market forces out of
force. Rather morality as a guideline for individual and collective action seems to be
important too. Economists have realised that market and morality are not necessarily
mutually exclusive and may even be complementary. This has been called ‘functional
ethic’. In business administration the concept of corporate ethics/corporate identity has
gained increasing importance. It is seen as a tool to reduce transaction costs compared to
alternative regulations and institutions that can oblige people to act in a certain way and
not another. These imply strong and costly control and sanction mechanisms.
However, in my opinion some degree of self-restriction beyond a functional ethic is
necessary for the stability of a market society. Such a self-restriction is set by a post-
conventional morality,9 ‘meta preferences’ (Hirschman 1993) and ‘ethical preferences’
(Harsanyi 1985), respectively.10 I want to emphasise that such a post-conventional
morality is based on reflection, discourse and insight (see Ulrich 1990) rather than on
unquestioned, collective guidelines. Weak states (among which are a number of
developing countries), on the other hand, lack three basic requirements for the
establishment of a stable market society: (1) the legitimacy of control; (2) the moral (or
with Elias, civilisatoric) self-restriction for the functioning of a market society (such as
the individual renunciation of violence and acknowledgement of human rights, but also
renunciation of corruption), and (3) a certain degree of ethical basic values and social
security. To put it another way: a market society requires the interplay of market,
legitimacy of the state and post-conventional morality of the economic agents (Schrader
1994a).
                                               
9 Homann (1990: 114) distinguished conventional and postconventional morality. The
former is based on belief, authority, fear of punishment in this or the next world etc. (i.e.
Elias's external constraints). Such a morality was replaced by postconventional forms in
the course of modernisation. They are based on an interpersonal insight into the
legitimacy of norms or the expectation at least that a legitimisation may be provided.
10 John C. Harsanyi (1985) distinguishes personal and ethical preferences, and Amartya
K. Sen (1977) claims that an economic theory should integrate several orders of
preferences of an individual and meta preference orders.
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3 .  Globa l i sa t ion ,  Pos tmodern i ty  and  Mora l i ty
If indeed a stable market society requires the composite of the three control principles
market, state and morality, as I suggested in the previous part, how then is this
equilibrium affected by the globalisation process? According to Elias the integration of
the nation-state resulted in a dissolution of lower levels of integration. So what happens
in the course of decrease of importance of the nation-state and the subsequent three-fold
process of globalisation, localisation and fragmentation? I outline three potential
scenarios.
(i) The first scenario is that the shift of control from the nation-state level to international
and transnational organisations and associations can compensate for former state
interference in the market against unintended consequences of the functioning of the
supply-demand-price mechanism. However, I guess that this is not very probable for the
following reason: the international and transnational agencies have much less power than
national ones because every political action requires a consensus between the member
countries and their conflicting interests. Therefore most progressive and far-reaching
ideas and implementations result in compromises and minimum changes (if not a
conservation of the status quo).
(ii) The second scenario is that the loss of the monopoly of force at the nation-state level
increases the probability of warfare - not so much between nation-states rather than
along, first of all, infra-national boundaries. Instead of the ‘civilised’ world-war of
nation-states, violence can take the form of ‘barbarian’ civil wars within former nation
states. The past decades provide sufficient examples from all over the world (even from
‘civilised’ Europe) to prove this, so that I instead turn my attention to another potential
‘demarcation line’: newly emerging boundaries on the supra-national level.
There is, first of all, the potential of trade ‘wars’ between economic blocks. The recent
showdown between the United States and Japan provides such an example. The Far East
so far was the most promising, but at the same time most suspect economic region for the
West. However, a new potential conflict area emerges. The continously strenghtened
position of the EU provides a challenge for the USA. Both regions have different
economic structures and divergent interests (the EU, contrary to the USA, strongly
depends on exports) that might result in a US protectionism and trade war.
11
There is, secondly, the vision of the rise of the developing countries against the
industrial countries that has been taken as an issue in the science-fiction movie ‘The
Long March’. What was in the film at the beginning a peoples’ movement from Africa
into South Europe because of hunger and a lack of job opportunities, ended in a massacre
among the migrants by European military that defended the European boundaries and
wealth against outsiders. A variation of this topic is Huntington’s hypothesis of ‘cultural
clashes’ between civilisations that I want to consider now. While during the cold-war era
the rule of different inner and outer morality and control of force followed the ideological
pattern of politico-economic blocks (which from the point of view of the West was
reduced to freedom versus communism, from the perspective of the East to decadence
versus communitarism) and potential warfare for these values, this pattern got lost with
the collapse of the socialist countries. However, Huntington discovers a new danger:
Islam that even congregates with Confucianism. He argues that cultural entities form a
large grouping which is based on the broadest level of cultural identity: civilisations.
Huntington mentions the following reasons for these clashes: a basic difference between
civilisations, a growing awareness of these differences, a religious fundamentalism which
intensifies this distinct feeling, a shift of the orientation of cultural elites from the West to
their own cultural context (indigenisation of elites), the deep roots of cultural identity,
and an increasing economic regionalism with its bias on cultural terms.
As a counter-strategy for the west Huntington suggests to form an alliance with Latin
America and Eastern Europe against the Muslim world, to slow down Western
rearmament and retain military supremacy, to stop local conflicts which could escalate
into larger wars, and to practice a policy of divide and impera to finally find a deeper
understanding.
Huntington’s hypothesis has been rejected. According to Hartmann (1995) the
particular problem of Huntington’s view is whether indeed culture or civilisation may be
the variable which permits cohesion and produces a potential of conflict between East
and West. Another problem which Huntington only shortly addresses is the linkage of
conflict and confrontation. Albert O. Hirschman (1993, quoted by Hartmann 1995)
distinguishes two classes of conflict: conflict over more-or-less versus conflict over
either-or. While the first class of conflicts can be solved without confrontation (positive
conflict), the latter represents a cut-throat conflict. Even either-or conflicts do not
necessarily lead to an elimination of either of the parties involved. Temporary solutions
can be found. Or, certain elements in the conflict can be negotiated. Hirschman suggests
12
that either-or conflicts should be resolved as more-or-less conflicts. Furthermore, I
believe that such highl-level identity markers such as inhabitant of the same civilisation
or periphery do not constitute a joint basis for collective action because this view
overlooks the structural heterogeneity of civilisations or the Third World.
(iii) Instead of further addressing the question of violence I would like to again turn my
attention to the third scenario. As outlined, globalisation is first of all linked with the
decline of the importance of the nation-state as a control principle and an increase of the
importance of regionalised transnational markets and political units. It is the assumption
that the new disequilibrium of the control principles market and state in the course of
globalisation may be compensated by an increase of the control principle morality. This
is what I want to consider in the last part of my paper. For the sake of argument I want to
separately discuss the levels of individual and collective action.
(a) individual actors
On the individual level the transition to post-industrial or post-modern society has been
described as a loss of identity and disorientation. The information society requires the
decision either to get out on the data highway and surf in the internet or to be cut off from
the world. The data revolution seems to have speeded up the globe’s rotation and people
have got dizzy. The limits to growth (Hirsch 1977) and the contradictions of capitalism
(Bell 1991) and the welfare state (Offe 1984) have become visible, obvious and painful
for the citizens. What we previously had to struggle for in the post-war industrial society,
namely consumer goods and a certain living standard, has been obtained by a large
number of people in the West and is therefore less attractive. Markets of industrial
societies have been saturated, a consumer crisis has emerged. Neo-conservative
politicians and employers deny such a structural crisis. They think in terms of trade
cycles, still believe in growth models and expect a solution to the temporary growth crisis
in a global, deregulated market and a deep cut in the social costs of production.
From the sociological point of view post-modernism is characterised by a process of
de-legitimisation heated by the demand of legitimisation itself. According to Lyotard
(1990: 335) we no longer have recourse to the grand narratives. History is no longer a
chronological process. The belief in progress has been de-constructed. As for a number
of people consumerism is no longer meaningful, they search for individual strategies of
sense-giving such as religious or ecological movements.
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Ulrich Beck (1993, 1994) concludes that the industrial society has further transgressed
to the individualised risk society. The individual’s coping with the loss of identities has
been described as a recourse on ethnic, kinship and neighbourhood grounds and on
individualised networks. Beck identifies a decreasing importance of collective structures
of the industrial societies such as memberships in political parties or labour unions or that
‘citizen’ as a meaningful pattern is questioned with the emergence of new issues such as
‘world society’. Nowadays the individual is the important unit for claims and liabilities
and increasingly dependent from labour market and welfare state.
However, Beck does not stop at the level of a deconstruction of identities. He argues
that individualisation is not a synonym for atomisation, isolation or loneliness, rather than
an active design of the own future and individual biographies. The process of
individualisation is the simultaneous disembedding and re-embedding of life-styles, the
dissolution of traditional and construction of new forms of solidarity, which are based on
individual networks.
Neo-substantivists suggest to re-emded certain economic action and interaction.
Stanfield (1990) provides a very idealistic view arguing that the main problem in the
current economic and ecological crisis involves the interaction of economy and society.
The structural crisis of capitalism provides the chance to restructure the economy
according to the requirements of the lives it should serve. This means that one should
drop the egocentric, eurocentric and econocentric perspective of the neoliberalists and
instead take a substantivist perspective of social reproduction and unfoldment. Right-
wing politicians turn this argument into a justification that certain obligations of and
claims on public goods and services in the welfare state should be privatised again and
provided by self-organised means, if not sold via the market.
I do not want to go into too much detail here. However, I want to emphasise that with
the increase of importance of the control principle market and the loss of importance of
the nation-state in the course of globalisation, ideologies and individuals take recourse on
an increase of the control principle morality. Frank Parkin has emphasised the
development of subordinate value systems in the ‘moral density’ of local communities.
They are based on localised social knowledge and personalised relations (Parkin 1971:
90). Berner’s (1995) studies on localities in Manila slums confirm this.
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(b) collective actors
Let us change the perspective to the level of firms, enterprises and organisations. The
technical revolution in the information society has further internationalised the exchange
relations.11 A general argument is that time and space have become less important as
factors for production and distribution from the point of economics: market places have
become disembodied, and social relations disembedded from space and time (see
Giddens 1990). Due to the law of supply and demand space in the metropolises has
become unaffordable, and labour in the West too costly. Therefore, so the argument,
whole branches have been shifted to other countries or at least upcountry such as
important software production to Bangalore or chip production to Silicon valley.
However, status and corporate culture require large, particularly international, firms to
run impressive offices at the nodal points of the world economy, the world cities (Sassen
1994) that symbolise the firms' importance. The perhaps most advanced international
market is the financial market. Laymen can hardly understand the types of businesses that
take place in this market, particularly the trade in futures. Significant, however, is that
already during the period of Keynesianism, but particularly now, the international
financial market is the market par excellence that does not fit the neoclassical model.
Concentration occurred during the past two decades, the market is susceptible to
speculation, and therefore developments are hardly prognosticable. For example, nobody
can explain the present undervalued dollar price. Furthermore, the important indices
(Dow Jones, Dax and Nikkei in Wall Street, Frankfurt and Tokyo, respectively) on actual
developments in the financial market do not necessarily fluctuate in conjunction because
they reflect expectations rather than actual developments, which are still dependent on
national politics in these regions or nation-states.
To make this description short: What seems to me important is that the globalisation of
business has led to a strong increase of complexity of economic life, uncertainty and risk
for the enterprises involved.12 The free domestic market meant an increase of chances
and alternatives of action because of the depersonalisation of market relations. The
                                               
11 Korff and Heidenreich (1991) identified a transformation of international into
transnational firms. International firms rely on the utilisation of differently priced means
of production. Transnational firms, on the other hand, aim at setting up a world-wide
network to use synergy effects and reduce transation costs.
12 System theory distinguishes between uncertainty and risk. Uncertainty means that the
outcome of a situation is open, while risk involves the probability of an outcome.
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traditional disciplinary mechanisms of securing business, namely (internal and external)
morality, personal knowledge of the exchange partner, long-established business
relations (experience), public opinion, personal threat etc. were supplemented by an
efficient framework of national law and justice and a monopoly of force to apply
disciplinary mechanisms - a high degree of certainty in planning and justice. In
international markets, however, it is not so easy to fall back upon the law in case of
difficulties in the fulfilment of agreements to force the businesspartner on the opposite
side of the globe to pay, deliver timely or at all or fulfill certain standards. International
law is highly complicated. There are different national laws, there is a trans-
nationalisation of firms, there is a very ponderous international justice, and there is a
distinction between inner and outer morality of economic actors.
How then does transnational business cope with such difficulties? Research has shown
that a trans-nationalisation of enterprise is not simply a shift of national competition to a
higher level or - what is usually associated with it - a concentration process by
eliminating weaker firms. Rather it is a specialisation of enterprise in certain niches in
which they get an advantageous, sometimes quasi-monopolistic position due to lack of
competition. Trans-nationalisation is a differentiation process, a transnational division of
labour that creates dependencies between the highly specialised enterprises (Korff and
Heidenreich 1991). An example provides the production of air crafts in the future.
Investment is so high and know-how so specialised that even the competitors Boing and
Airbus co-operate in the development of this aircraft generation.
However, I want to go a step further in my analysis. I think, for an understanding of
globalisation of business and finance it is useful to remember how market integration
took place in the course of emergence of merchant capitalism and long-distance trade
(see Braudel 1984, Schrader 1994b). One solution to these problems of uncertainty and
risk was and is the falling back on personalised relations. I propose that a number of
international networks of firms. Each network is characterised by close, personalised
relations. Internationalisation and personalisation, globalisation and localisation are
processes that happen at the same time. And, what seems to me important, both processes
threaten the nation-state and citizenship as meaningful levels of identity (see Korff 1995).
My statement requires some more reflection. For that reason I provide a short discourse
on the phenomenon of business groups. With business groups Granovetter (1994: 454)
means ‘a collection of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal
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ways’. He refers to an intermediate level of binding, which can take various forms:
conglomerates,13 holdings companies and trusts,14 stable cartels or loose coalitions of
firms.15 Strachan (1976: 2, quoted by Granovetter 1994: 456) emphasises the great
diversity of enterprises in a group and an atmosphere of loyalty and trust which is
normally associated with family or kinship groups.
Economists use to interpret business groups in a functionalist way as adaptations to
specific economic problems. In the transformation process of economy and society
business groups were characterised by kinship, religious, ethnic or minority ties. These
were, so the argument, impediments in the emergence of modern enterprise, however,
only a middle-run phenomenon that was expected to disappear in the process of
modernisation. However, reality shows that business groups have continued to be
important. I argue in accordance with supporters of New Institutional Economics that
business groups are expected to arise in situations where they provide some type of
economic advantage. To my mind they are important for every society because they
provide the advantage to reduce the complexity of economic life, uncertainty and risk,
but they are particularly relevant for the international context as well as in states with
high risks in planning and a corrptive bureaucracy and judicial system. According to
Goto (1982: 53, quoted by Granovetter 1994: 457) a firm ‘can economise on the
transaction costs that it would have incurred (...) through the market, and at the same
time, it can avoid the scale of diseconomies or control loss which would have occurred if
it had expanded internally and performed that transaction within the firm or through the
market, the firm has the incentive to form or to join a group’.
Granovetter rejects such a functionalist view as too narrow. He emphasises the degree
of social solidarity and social structure among component firms. According to Leff
(1978: 663) members of business groups are linked by relations of trust, based on a
                                               
13 According to Strachan (1976: 20) in a conglomerate 'a common parent owns the
subsidiaries but generally few operational or personal ties exist among the sister
subsidiaries. On the other hand, within business groups, (...) there are generally personal
and operational ties among all the firms'.
14 Holding companies and trusts are business groups in which the constituent firms keep
their own management and identity.
15 Such coalitions have no legal status and in which no single firm or individual holds
controlling interests of the other firms (e.g. Mitsubishi). These groups may be kept
together by mutual stockholding or frequent meetings of the management.
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similar personal, ethnic or communal background. With regard to trust I would argue that
in contemporary international business the element of trust is substituted to some degree
by other risk-reducing mechanisms, for example, by testing the business partner, and
finally by establishing long-term trading relations, which are based on experience rather
than trust. On the level of society Heinemann (1987) called this reduction of risk and
uncertainty ‘social certainty’, an expectation in the contingency of behaviour of others
(see Schrader 1994c).
Another link of business groups is according to Granovetter the interlocking directorate,
in which group companies have common members in the boards of directors, or - and
this seems to me very important for international relations - cross-stockholding
arrangement, i.e. the acquiring of shares of the other firms of the business group.
Granovetter adds another factor for business group cohesion: ‘moral economy’.
“For business groups, my intention here is to make moral economy a
variable, by asking for given groups to what extent their operations
presuppose a moral community in which trustworthy behaviour can be
expected, normative standards understood, and opportunism foregone (...)
More generally, among business groups the world over, there are clear
demarcations in the extent to which members see themselves as part of a
moral economy” (Granovetter 1994: 466-7).
To my mind these ‘sociological’ characteristics of business groups are not necessarily
opposed to the transaction cost approach. Rather this concept is useful because of its
broad understanding of cost components. From the point of view of a business group
membership means a reduction of complexity of economic life by solidarity links, moral
economy, personal knowledge, corporate identity, etc. Also economists agree that trust
and solidarity are important when this provides economic benefits. This is a functional
ethic.
I think that it makes sense to link the moral economy approach with the corporate
ethic/corporate identity concept. Not only that a corporate ethic engenders an
identification of the employees with their firm or business group, an atmosphere of moral
economy so that personal well-being and that of the enterprises are felt as the same and
everybody tries his or her best. Furthermore, a corporate ethic is a functional tool to
attract attention in an intricate market (North 1990, Wieland 1994). It symbolises
personal values in business relations such as trustworthiness, morality, honour, justice,
responsibility, etc. Firms are a network of contracts which generate ex ante and ex post
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transaction costs. Corporate ethic/corporate identity is a tool to lower transaction costs
(Williamson 1981, 1985).
To summarise my argument: business groups have so far largely been discussed with
regard to certain transition periods in which personalised relations provided advantages
to impersonalised ones. To my mind the globalisation of economy and society is such a
period. It once again inlarges the possible alternatives of action. However, due to the
complexity of economic life firms aim to reduce uncertainty and risk of economic action.
Therefore networks of personalised relations are very important in business relations.
This creates the seeming paradox that globalisation of business and personalisation of
business relations form a couplet. The disembodied, global market is in reality
constituted by a large number of business networks and business groups. Nodal points of
these networks and groups are the world cities, central places for business groups. This is
the second seeming paradox: the structure of global markets and market-places that
anthropologists discuss, is from such a perspective very similar.
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